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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The statement of jurisdiction contained in the 
first paragraph of the appellant's statement of jurisdiction 
is adopted by respondent. The remainder of the paragraphs 
contained in the statement of jurisdiction are not adopted 
as statements of jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The plaintiff and appellant does not appeal from 
the jury's verdict, nor does it contest that the verdict is 
not supported by the evidence. 
The appeal has been taken on two issues. The first 
is an alleged error by the trial court in admitting parole 
evidence. Respondents agree with the appellant's first 
issue as stated in the statement of issues dealing with the 
parole evidence question. 
As to the second basis for appeal, appellant claims 
error by virtue of a juror being on the panel who lived in 
the same condominium complex as defendants, and by alleged 
fal.se testimony from one of defendant's witnesses. 
Respondents do not believe that the appellant has 
correctly stated the issue with respect to its second basis 
of appeal, and believes that the issue relative to the 
second basis of appeal should properly be stated as raising 
a question as to whether or not the jury panel was qualified 
and whether challenges for cause were properly preserved and 
made at the trial court level. 
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Since appellant has not briefed the issue relative 
to alleged false testimony of a witness, no issue is pre-
sented relative to the same. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Attached as an addendum, (as "Exhibit A") to 
respondent's brief, is a copy of Rule 47 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure dealing with jurors. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant and plaintiff below (hereinafter 
referred to as Realty World) filed suit in the Fifth Circuit 
Court against the respondents and defendants below, 
(hereinafter referred to as Marsdens) seeking to recover a 
real estate commission alleged to be due and owing as a 
result of the sale of the Marsdens' condominium. 
For its claim Realty World relied upon an agreement 
attached as an addendum to this brief (as "Exhibits B and 
C") entitled Sales Agency Contract (exclusive rights to sell). 
The agent for Realty World, Thomas E. Eveleth, was 
a personal friend of the Marsdens, and was a neighbor living 
in the same condominium complex as the Marsdens. 
The Marsdens claimed in defense of Realty World's 
complaint, that they had entered into an agreement with 
Realty World's agent, Thomas E. Eveleth, that if they found 
a party who was interested in purchasing the condominium 
(independent from the efforts of Realty World), then a com-
mission would not be owing. 
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Prior to the jury trial in this case, the trial 
court pre-tried this case to determine what issues would be 
presented at trial. Realty World did not make any claim at 
the pre-trial, at the hearing on a subsequent motion con-
cerning parole evidence, nor at the trial alleging that the 
claims of fraud asserted by Marsdens had not been plead with 
specificity. 
At the pre-trial of the case, the trial judge 
directed that the parties brief the court on issues pertain-
ing to whether or not parole evidence concerning the oral 
agreements that Marsdens desired to testify to would be 
admitted by the court. 
The matter was briefed, and a hearing was held by 
the court. Copies of the depositions were provided to the 
court and reviewed. As a result of the hearing, the court 
rendered its order, which has been attached as an addendum 
to this brief as "Exhibit Dlf . In the order, the court spe-
cifically found that: 
. . . the court specifically finds 
that the contracts in question and 
which are relied upon by the plaintiff 
are ambiguous and not integrated 
agreements. 
On the scheduled day for jury trial, a prospective 
panel of jurors was presented and questioned by the court in 
detail. The court then allowed counsel to submit to the 
court any additional questions or subject areas for inquiry 
of the jury panel. Following said questioning, counsel for 
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Realty World and Marsdens passed the jury for cause, and no 
challenges for cause were made by Realty World. 
Prior to the trial, Realty World was aware that 
Marsdens would be calling Rita Luke as a trial witness. 
They were further aware as to the subject matter she would 
testify to. Her deposition was not taken prior to trial by 
Realty World. 
Following the trial of the case, and rendering of a 
special verdict in favor of Marsdens, Realty World moved the 
court for a new trial alleging that one of the jurors lived 
in the same condominium complex as Marsdens, and also 
alJeged that the witness, Rita Luke had testified falsely. 
The court denied the motion for a new trial. The 
court reviewed its notes with counsel, and indicated that 
specific questions had been asked of each juror if there was 
any reason why the case could not be judged fairly by said 
juror, and the answer had been in the negative by juror 
Conder. 
The court also noted that Realty World called no 
witnesses at the trial of the case in rebuttal to witness 
Rita Luke. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly allowed the introduction 
of parole evidence by Marsdens, since a specific finding was 
made by the trial court that the agreements relied upon by 
Realty World were not integrated documents, and were 
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ambiguous. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
making said ruling, and in allowing parole evidence to be 
introduced to the jury. 
Realty World has not preserved its claims that 
fraud was not plead with specificity, and even if Lt has 
preserved said claims, the allegations of fraud are not the 
basis upon whjch the trial court allowed the Introduction of 
parole evidence, and therefore, there has been no harm 
caused to Realty World. 
Realty World did not preserve an issue for appeal 
relative to the juror Conder. No challenge for cause was 
made. The agent for Realty World, Thomas Eveleth, Realty 
World's only witness at trial was also a resident of the 
same condominium complex as Marsdens and as the juror was 
aJleged to be, and that issue was not raised to the court's 
attention by Mr. Eveleth. 
Realty World was aware of the witness, Rita Luke, 
and of the fact that she would be called at trial, and what 
she would testify concerning. Further, following her 
testimony, no rebuttal witnesses were offered by Realty 
World, nor was any claim made of surprise or inability to 
meet the testimony of Rita Luke, and therefore, the issue is 




THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
ALLOWING PAROLE EVIDENCE. 
Prior to the trial of this case, a pre-trial con-
ference was he]d between counsel for Realty World, counsel 
for Marsdens, and the trial judge, Phillip K. Palmer. The 
court discussed what issues would be tried, and whether or 
not there were any motions to be heard. Realty World raised 
no issue in its pleadings relative to the sufficiency of the 
claims and defenses plead by Marsdens, including their claim 
for fraud, and made no objections or raised any defenses to 
the same at the pre-trial conference. As a result of the 
pre-trial conference, and having discussed the issues, the 
trial court requested that the parties brief the issue to 
the court on parole evidence and argue the matter on a 
motion to admit said evidence. 
The issues were briefed, and were argued to the 
court. At the argument on the motions, the court indicated 
it had reviewed the briefs, and had also reviewed deposition 
testimony. Having reviewed the same and having heard the 
argument of counsel, the court entered its order and specif-
icalJy found that: 
the court specifically finds that the 
contracts in question and which are 
relied upon by the plaintiff are 
ambiguous and not integrated 
agreements. (See Addendum "Exhibit 
D" ) 
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In its brief on appeal, Realty World makes two 
arguments why the trial court was in error. The first argu-
ment is that our Supreme Court has previously construed an 
identical contract and found the same to be clear and 
unambiguous, and therefore parole evidence should not have 
been admitted. The second argument, is that fraud had not 
been plead with specificity by Marsdens and therefore, could 
not be used as a basis for alleging fraud as an exception to 
the parole evidence rule. 
In dealing with the two arguments of Realty World, 
the second argument will be dealt with first, since a review 
of the court's order makes it clear that the court did not 
make its determination that parole evidence would be admit-
ted based upon allegations of, or any finding on its part 
that there was any likelihood of a finding of fraud as 
against Realty World or its agent, Thomas E. Eveleth. In 
fact, the basis for the court's ruling was a finding that 
the contracts relied upon by Realty World were ambiguous and 
not integrated agreements. 
In dealing with the first basis of claimed error by 
the trial court, Realty World has relied upon the case of 
E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. vs. Broderick, 522 
P.2d. 144 (Utah 1974). 
The Strout case is not controlling in the case 
before this court, and does not mandate a holding that 
parole evidence should not be admitted based upon the facts 
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and circumstances that were presented to the trial judge. 
In the Strout case, there had been no modification of the 
document relied upon. Further, a review of the Strout 
opinion, indicates that there was not any real evidence to 
support a bona fide assertion on the part of the party 
claiming entitlement to admit parole evidence that there had 
ever been an oral agreement reached between the parties. 
Contrary to the Strout case, in this case, the doc-
ument relied upon Realty World, is titled "Sales Agency 
Contract", and right underneath that title is titled 
"(exclusive right to sell"). Further, in paragraph two of 
the agreement, it purports to require the owner of the prop-
erty to be responsible to pay a real estate commission 
whether the buyer is found by Realty World or by the 
Marsdens. Contrary to the title of the agreement and the 
provisions of paragraph two, Realty World's agent hand wrote 
onto the face of the agreement the words "3 names reserved". 
Testimony from deposition which was presented to the trial 
court, indicated that at a time after writing "3 names 
reserved" on the face of this document (which purported to 
be an exclusive right to sell) four names were presented to 
Realty World's agent, rather than just three. Therefore, 
the court found that the handwriting on the face of the 
agreement created an ambiguity and a question whether the 
document was integrated. 
The court's order is consistent with the Utah 
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Supreme Court's pronouncement of the law relative to parole 
evidence as stated in the Union Bank vs. Swensen case, 707 
P.2d 663 (Utah 1985). In the Union Bank case, the Supreme 
Court stated that: 
the parole evidence ruLe, as a princi-
pal of contract interpretation, has a 
very narrow application. Simply 
stated, the rule operates in the 
absence of fraud to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, state-
ments or representations offered for 
the purpose of varying or adding to 
the terms of an integrated contract, 
(quoting from page 665 of the 
opinion). 
Using the standard of narrow application assigned 
by the Supreme Court, the court in Union Bank then when on 
to note that in all cases where parole evidence becomes an 
issue, the threshold question concerning whether the parties 
intended the subject writing to be an integrated agreement, 
must be answered. Commenting on this threshold question, 
the court stated that: 
therefore,, a court must first deter-
mine whether the writing was intended 
by the parties to be an integration. 
In resolving this preliminary question 
of fact, parole evidence, indeed, any 
relative evidence is admissable. 
(quoting from page 665 of the 
opinion). 
When the trial judge ruled on the admissability of 
the evidence, he had reviewed the pleadings and deposition 
testimony and it was represented by counsel for both Realty 
World and Marsdens that the testimony that was anticipated 
to be offered would be testimony from the Marsdens claiming 
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that before they signed the sales agency contract, that they 
had specifically discussed with the agent (who had been a 
friend and was a neighbor in the same condominium complex 
with them), the fact that they would not be required to pay 
a real estate commission if they sold the condominium to a 
party who had not been introduced to the property, or 
brought to the property by Realty World, The testimony was 
also presented to the court, that Marsdens would testify 
that the person who purchased the property, in fact, was not 
introduced to the Marsdens, nor did he become aware of the 
property through any of the efforts of Realty World. That 
individual was Paul Stevens, and was deposed prior to trial 
and also testified at trial as stated. 
The Union Bank case also establishes that at a 
minimum, all relevant evidence is admissable on the thresh-
old issue of whether the writing was adopted by the parties 
as an integration of their agreement. 
The trial court was aware of the various claims of 
the parties, the testimony that would be offered, and had 
reviewed the agreement knowing that parole evidence would 
have been admissable for threshold purposes anyway, and was 
properly admissable as competent evidence to establish 
Marsdens' claim as to the agreement that they felt had been 
reached. It is also important to note that the jury, as the 
finder of fact, also felt the evidence was probative, since 
its verdict supported the Marsdens1 claim that an oral 
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agreement had been reached as testified to. 
If Realty World felt that there was a good faith 
basis for claiming that the trial judge erred in admitting 
parole evidence, certainly it would have requested a tran-
script of the hearing held before the judge on the issue of 
parole evidence, and also at the trial of the case. 
When the parole evidence was offered at trial, the 
same should have been preserved by objection, with a tran-
script for this court to review. 
II. 
REALTY WORLD HAS NOT PRESERVED ISSUES 
RELATIVE TO THE SELECTION OF THE JURY 
AND ALLEGED FALSE TESTIMONY FOR 
APPEAL. 
It is alleged that the proceedings were "tainted" 
by false testimony from one of defendant's witnesses in the 
statement of issues presented by Realty World. That issue 
has not been briefed, and Marsdens feel that the same was 
not preserved at the trial court level. Further, on appeal, 
by not briefing the same, the issue is really not before 
this court. Should the court determine that the issue has 
been preserved, it is difficult for Marsdens to anticipate 
what may be argued in that regard. 
If Realty World argues that one of defendants1 
witnesses, Rita Luke, testified falsely, there was no objec-
tion made on that basis to her testimony at trial. No 
motions were made that Realty World was surprised or preju-
diced by the testimony, and more importantly, no rebuttal 
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evidence was presented. After trial, by motion for a new 
trial, Realty World argued to the trial court that the tes-
timony was false and presented an affidavit from a potential 
witness, but gave no explanation for why that person had not 
been called as a rebuttal witness at the trial of the case. 
III. 
JURY SELECTION WAS LAWFUL 
Realty World claims that juror Lee Verl Conder was 
a resident of the same condominium complex as Marsdens, and 
therefore tainted the proceedings. 
It should be noted that the agent of Realty World, 
Thomas E. Eveleth, was a resident of the same condominium 
complex as Marsdens as well. Mr. Eveleth was present during 
the selection of the jury. 
Counsel was given an opportunity to ask all jurors 
any questions that had not already been asked by the court 
by directing additional questions to the court. 
A full opportunity for questioning occurred, and 
then the jury panel was passed for cause. No challenges for 
cause were made by Realty World. 
Rule 47(f) requires that challenges for cause be 
made for the grounds indicated for ruling by the trial 
court. Subparagraph 6 of Rule 47(f) provides a challenge 
for cause: 
that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to 
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the cause, or to either party, which 
will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party 
challenging; . . . 
There was no challenge made to Mr. Conder by Realty 
World. Further, no preemptory challenge was made to Mr. 
Conder, and the information was certainly just as available 
to Realty World and its agent, Thomas E. Eveleth, who sat at 
counsel table during jury selection as it was to the 
Marsdens. Further, there has been no evidence presented 
that Mr. Conder, in fact, acted with any bias or prejudice 
as contemplated by the Rule. 
When this issue was raised to the trial court in a 
motion for a new trial, the trial court specifically 
referred back to its notes and indicated to counsel that 
questions had been asked to the jury specifically dealing 
with whether or not there was any bias or reason that a par-
ticular juror would not fairly judge the facts from the evi-
dence presented, and Mr. Conder did not indicate that he 
would have any bias or prejudice. In the Jenkins vs. 
Parrish, 627 P.2d. 533 (Utah 1981), case relied upon by 
Realty World, a juror specifically gave reason to the trial 
court to believe that she would have a problem in fairly 
judging the case. There is no such evidence in this case. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has been faced with cases 
where there has been an actual relationship or some 
knowledge, and has indicated that it was not error to leave 
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a juror on the panel. In the case of State vs. Baran, 474 
P.2d. 728 (Utah 1970), the Supreme Court was faced with a 
challenge that error had been committed by leaving certain 
members of the jury panel on the panel. The alleged grounds 
were, that "eight members had been victims of robbery, two 
had previously read about defendant in the newspaper, one 
had served on a jury in 1954 on a robbery case, and one 
lived in the same neighborhood as defendant's estranged 
wife". In the court's opinion, it was indicated that all of 
the eight members were questioned and responded that they 
held no opinions of bias or prejudice. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court indicated under the facts in the Baran case, 
that: 
in the instant action, the trial court 
conscientiously interrogated the mem-
bers of the jury panel. Not one of 
the members stated that he had previ-
ously formed or expressed an opinion, 
and each indicated that he would act 
wit}) impartiality. The grounds 
asserted by defendant do not consti-
tute actual bias as defined in 
§77-30-18(2). 
In this case, the trial judge indicated and in 
fact, conscientiously interrogated the members of the jury 
panel. That fact is supported by the record, and once again 
the record has not been requested in the form of a tran-
script by Realty World, and therefore there is no support 
for Its claims in regard to juror Conder. 
In the case of C.R. Owens Trucking Corporation vs. 
Stewart, 509 P.2d. 821 (Utah 1973), the plaintiff appealed 
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claiming error in the jury selection. In the court's 
opinion, the examination of jurors was referred to, and the 
court stated that: 
That examination, which is made a part 
of the record here, indicates that the 
prospective jurors did have an 
acquaintance with the defendant, 
however, it is shown that the court 
was carefuL to exclude from the paneL 
the Veniremen who indicated bias or 
prejudice in favor of the defendant or 
who indicated a desire to be excused 
from sitting on the case. At the con-
clusion of the examination, counsel 
for the plaintiff challenged for 
cause, nine members of the panel, on 
the grounds that they were acquainted 
with the defendant, and also on the 
basis that they or their spouses were 
engaged in raising livestock. The 
plaintiff's challenges for cause do 
not fall without the grounds specified 
in Rule 47(f) U.R.C.P., and the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in 
not removing from the panel, the 
jurors challenged. 
It is clear from the Barans case and C.R. Owens 
case, that even if Mr. Conder was a resident of the same 
condominium complex, and even if he did know the Marsdens 
and/or Mr. Eveleth, that the same would not have been 
grounds to have removed him from the jury panel, and there-
fore there has been no prejudicial error committed even if 
the issue is deemed to have been preserved for appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents Marsdens respectfully request the court 
affirm the trial court's ruling, admitting parole evidence 
and affirm the jury's verdict in the case, finding that 
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there was no error or irregularity in the jury panel pre-
sented as potential trial jurors in the case. 
DATED this day of January, 1988. 
STRONG Sc HANNI 
By. 
Paul M. Belnap 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Respondents Marsden 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this day of 
January, 1988 I hand-delivered the foregoing to the 
fol]owing: 
James H. Deans, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
175 South Main Street, #500 




Rule 47 UTAH RULEb OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Compiler 's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 46, F R C P 
Cross-References. -
tions to jury, Rule 51 
Objections to mstruc-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Form of verdict 
—Duty to examine and object 
Instructions 
—Right to object 
Harmless error 
Cited 
Form of verdict. 
—Duty to examine and object. 
Counsel has the obligation not onh to object 
to the form of the verdict, but to affirmatively 
seek to examine it, by failing to request court 
permission to examine the verdict and make 
objection tc it. partv waived any objection to 
the verdict form Martineau v Anderson. 636 
P2d 1039 (Utah 1981). 
Ins t ruc t ions . 
—Right to object. 
The parties have a right to make objections 
to the instructions to preserve challenges to 
their accuracy; if counsel was prevented from 
making objections to instructions, he should, 
under this rule, be deemed to have done so 
Hanks v Chnstensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P 2d 
564 11960) 
Harmless error. 
If the instructions are correct, any error 
which prevents counsel from making objections 
thereto is harmless error Hanks v. 
Chnstensen. 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P 2d 564 
(1960) 
Cited in Watters 
(Utah 1981) 
Querry 626 P 2d 455 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am Jur 2d Appeal and 
Error $501 5 Am Jur 2d Appeal and Error 
^ 545, 553, 558 
C.J.S. — 4 C J S Appeal and Error ^ 228 
et seq , 324 
A.L.R. — Sufficiency in federal court of mo-
tion in limine to preserve for appeal objection 
to evidence absent contemporary objection at 
trial. 76 A L R Fed 619 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 169 
et seq , 248 
Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself con-
duct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or 
their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is 
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such addi-
tional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addi-
tion to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. 
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, 
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the 
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the 
same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An 
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 47 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called 
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those other-
wise allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against 
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall 
not be used against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined, by whom made. A challenge is an objection made 
to the trial jurors and may be directed (1 to the panel or (2) to an individual 
uror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several 
Darties on either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A 
•hallenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the 
brms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the 
ntentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors 
Irawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be 
loted by the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
round of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the 
iry so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
e» Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory chal-
mges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause, 
lach party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as pro-
ided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken 
i one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a 
person competent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, 
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, 
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to 
either party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond 
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor 
and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a 
resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license 
fee, or service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to 
such resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous 
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then 
a witness therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the ac-
tion, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as 
a member or citizen of a municipal corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journal or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
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Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court The juror challenged 
and any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such 
challenge 
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of 
jurors that are to trv the cause plus such an additional number as will allow 
for all peremptory challenges permitted After each challenge for cause sus-
tained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further chal-
lenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause When 
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors 
remaining in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, 
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in 
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be 
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order m which they appear on the list, 
and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury 
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be adminis-
tered to the jurors, in substance, that thev and each of them will well and 
truly try the matter m issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the court 
(1) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the impanelling of the 
jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his 
duty and there is no alternate juror the parties may agree to proceed with the 
other jurors or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew If the 
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be 
tried with a new jury 
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury 
to have a \ lew of the property which is the subject of litigation or of the place 
in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to bt conducted in a 
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them 
bv some person appointed by the court for that purpose While the jury are 
thus absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them 
on any subject connected with the trial 
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either dur-
ing the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished 
by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them 
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury 
they may decide in court or retire for deliberation If they retire they must be 
kept together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they 
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Unless by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must 
not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, 
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, 
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their 
dehbe ations or the verdict agreed upon 
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may 
take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers 
which have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions 
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from 
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the person having them in possession; and they may also take with them 
notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves 
or any of them, but none taken by any other person. 
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for delib-
eration, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testi-
mony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, 
they may require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being 
brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of, 
or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in 
writing or taken down by the reporter. 
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented 
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew. 
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. 
While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in 
respect to other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with 
the cause submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury dis-
charged. The court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the 
opening of the court, in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment 
for the day. 
(q) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or 
such other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to 
Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their 
names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the 
verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the 
:lerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either 
party may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or 
:lerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling 
there is an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, tht jury must be 
sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be dis-
:harged from the cause. 
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insuffi-
:ient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury 
nay be sent out again. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in 
*ule 47^a) and (b), F.R.C.P. civil case, Utah Const.. Art. I, Sec. 10. 
Cross-References. — Jurors generally, Witness, juror as, § 78-24-3; Rule 606, 
; 78-46-1 et seq. U.R.E. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Additional instructions. 
-Absence of counsel. 
Prejudice. 
-Entry of judge into jury room 
'hallenges for cause. 
-Acquaintance with party. 
-Bias or prejudice. 
Malpractice. 
Waiver of right to challenge. 
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FORM A SALES AGENCY CONTRACT 
(Exclusive Right To Sell) 
Member of Multiple Listing Service of Salt Lake Board of REAL TORS* 
1. In consideration of your agreement to list the property described on form B and to use 
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser or tenant therefor. I hereby grant you for the period statea 
herein, from date hereof, the exclusive right to sell, lease or exchange said property or any part 
thereof, at the price and terms stated herein, or at such other price or terms to which I may agree in 
writing. 
2. During the life of this contract, if you find a party who is ready, able and willing to buy. lease 
or exchange said property or any part thereof, at said price and terms, or any other price or terms, to 
which I may agree in writing, or if said properly or any part thereof is sold, leased or exchanged 
during said term by myself or any other party. I agree to pay the broker listed below a commission of 
$ m Z H _ _ . or O* % of such sale, lease or exchange price which commission unless other-
wise agreed in writing, shall be due and payable on the date of closing the sale, lease or exchange. 
Should said properly be sold, leased or exchanged within ^ months after such expiration to 
any party to whom the property was offered or shown by me. or you. or any other party during the 
term of this listing, I agree to pay you the commission above stated if I am not obligated to pay a 
commission on such sale, lease or exchange to another broker pursuant to another sales agency 
contract entered into after the expiration date of this contract. 
3. You are hereby authorized to accept a deposit as earnest money from any potential buyer on 
the property as described on the property description and informational form (form B). Said deposit 
to be held in a trust account. 
4. I hereby warrant the information contained on the property description and informational 
form (form B) to be correct and that I have marketable title or an otherwise established right to sell, 
lease or exchange said property, except as stated. I agree to execute the necessary .documents of 
conveyance or lease and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses 
affecting said property to agreed date of possession and to furnish a good and marketable title with 
abstract to date or at my option a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price and in 
the name of the purchaser. In the event of sale or lease of other than real property, I agree to provide 
proper conveyance and acceptable evidence of title or right to sell, lease or exchange. 
5. In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement. I 
agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of collection. 
6. You are hereby authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or other party 
holding a lien or interest on this property. 
7. You are hereby authorized and instructed to offer this property through the Multiple Listing 
Service of the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS®. 
8. You are hereby authorized to place an appropriate sign on said property. 
9. This Sales Agency Contract may not be changed, modified or altered except by prior written 
consent executed by the Principal Broker and the owner(s) shown below, except that the listed price 
shall be changed by written request received from the owner(s). 
The parties hereto agree not to discriminate against any person or persons based on race, color, 
religion, sex or natjonal origin in connection with the sale, lease or exchange of properties under 
this agreement. C\ fc„, j , c S /^c. $ s t ^ iS <~ < ' 
LISTED PROPERTY / / / ^ /T. Cr ">' <T- Z-. 
(Address) 
(S ' H '-* 
(City) 
LISTED PRICE. S, 
(State) 
7 J~c o 
This contract is entered into this / / day of A< 1^ wf 
This contract expires on the / 7 day of , ^ ' ^ *"/ 
^^^^ Listing Company •*''/ 
19 
/ 'Z? > 
' Ownej-^Sigrtfturef '/-''£• ^ "•'£• '^c£ 
/ 
B Y ^ 
ipai Barter (Insert Name) , / , Owner (Signature) 
Authorr*#d Agent (Signature)^" 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of completed copies of this document (Form A) and the property 
description and information form (Form B). 
-frr- // Complete both Form A end Form 8 










PORMTA SALES AGENCY CONTRACT 
^ ^ (Exclusive Right To Sell) 
Member oYMultiple Listing Service dTSalt Lake Board of REALTORS** 
1 In consideration of your agreement to list the property described on form B and to use 
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser or tenant therefor. I hereby grant you for the period stated 
herein, from date hereof, the exclusive right to sell, lease or exchange said property or any part 
thereof, at the price and terms stated herein, or at such other price or terms to which I may agree in 
writing 
2 During the life of this contract, if you find a party who is ready able and willing to buy lease 
or exchange said property or any part thereof, at said price and terms or any other price or terms to 
which I may agree in wnting or if said property or any part thereof is sold leased or exchanged 
during said term by myself or any other party, I agree to pay the broker listed below a commission of 
$ ^ o r__ fcZ_% of such sale, lease or exchange price which commission unless other-
wise agreed in writing, shall be due and payable on the date ofpJosing the sale lease or exchange 
Should said property be sold leased or exchanged within ^ ^ months after such expiration to 
any party to whom the property was offered or shown by me. or you or any other party during the 
term of this listing, I agree to pay you the commission above stated if I am not obligated to pay a 
commission on such sale, lease or exchange to another broker pursuant to another sales agency 
contract entered into after the expiration date of this contract 
3 You are hereby authorized to accept a deposit as earnest money from any potential buyer on 
the properly as described on the property description and informational form (form B) Said deposit 
to be held in a trust account 
4 I hereby warrant the information contained on the property description and informational 
form (form B) to be correct and that I have marketable title or an otherwise established right to sell, 
lease or exchange said property, except as stated I agree to execute the necessary .documents of 
conveyance or lease and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses 
affecting said property to agreed date of possession and to furnish a good and marketable title with 
abstract to date or at my option a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price and in 
the name of the purchaser In the event of sale or lease of other than real property, I agree to provide 
proper conveyance and acceptable evidence of title or right to sell, lease or exchange 
5 In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement. I 
agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee and ail costs of collection 
6 You are hereby authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or other party 
holding a lien or interest on this property 
7 You are hereby authorized and instructed to offer this property through the Multiple Listing 
Service of the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS* 
8 You are hereby authorized to place an appropriate sign on said property 
9 This Sales Agency Contract may not be changed modified or altered except by prior written 
consent executed by the Principal Broker and the owner(s) shown below, except that the listed price 
shall be changed by written request received from the owner(s) 
The parties hereto agree not to discriminate against any person or persons based on race, color 
religion, sex or national origin in connection with the sale, lease or exchange of properties under 
this agreement 
LISTED PROPERTY /Ll CJ. S. / ^ ^ O S , 
^>/i L~ LM KJJ 6sT'\ ' i 2'*'2* 
(City) (Stat*) 
LISTED PRICE I C~l L CO 
This contract is entered into t h i s _ 2 _ S _ day of ^i^s /^ CL~ 1Q £ C 
This contract expires on tha 'JL >, day of r «v/ ) . ( —(
 < , 19 > (~? 
H*^c,/ass/>/?..< y ^ . / . L / ^ L z . Q ; ^ y # ^ - ^ - t 
Luting Company / Owntr (S^nalura) 
L* 
O w n r (Signature) 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of completed copies of this document (Form A) and the properly 
description and information form (Form B) -, y 
/ i Ownar 
Complete both form A, and Form 6 
1 copy to ownar — 1 obsy to latmg office S L B R Revisad 9/t /W 
'.^ms .^U^CC<A^_ _ 
EXHIBIT D 
Paul M. Belnap, 0279 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
REALTY WORLD STONEBROOK, : 
Plaintiff, : ORDER ON DEFENDANTS!S MOTION 
TO ADMIT PAROLE EVIDENCE 
vs. 
JAMES L. MARSDEN and : Civil No. 873000185-CV 




THOMAS E. EVELETH, : 
Third-Party Defendant. 
The above entitled matter came before the court on the defendants' 
motion to admit parole evidence on the 12th day of June, 1987 at the 
hour of 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Phillip K. Palmer with counsel 
for the plaintiff appearing and counsel for the defendants appearing. 
The Court having reviewed the memorandum, depositions and exhibits sub-
mitted by counsel, and having heard the arguments of counsel, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the defendant's 
motion to admit parole evidence is granted, and the court specifically 
finds that the contracts in question and which are relied upon by 
the plaintiff are ambiguous and not integrated agreements. 
DATED this f® day of July, 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
rcuit Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid on this 
}3r day of July, 1987. 
Mr. James K. Deans 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
175 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
By LdaJJasx 
-2-
